The Development Experience In Iraq Between The Facts Of Failure And The Ingredients For Success

Abstract

Abstract

The Iraqi development experience is an arena of conflict, in which the roles of self-motivations and external motives are exchanged to root the landmarks of underdevelopment or create elements of success, since according to the indicators of progress derived from global development experiences, the Iraqi economy was at a stagnant position, not approaching the standard image of progress by about a few meters away from it. The reason in all cases is external in general, and to reach an accurate understanding of the subjective and objective debate in thwarting the Iraqi development process, we decided to study it through two axes:

The first axis: economic challenges.

The second axis: civil challenges.

We have concluded from our study to a fundamental conclusion that “indicators of authority as the essential engine of development work have remained far from“ rationality and effectiveness, ”thus Iraq occupied an advanced position in the list of the most fragile states that both caused and died at the same time.